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5 Our understanding of causal relations is so much a part of our daily lives that it is often
forgotten that the fundamentals of this ability are not yet fully understood. One of the
central findings regarding the human causal inference process is that the necessity and/
or sufficiency of the cause assume a central role in the inference process (Cummins, 1995;
Markovits & Barrouillet, 2002; Thompson, 1994; 2000). We will investigate how people
understand and assess these central properties,  i.e.  the necessity and sufficiency of a
cause for the effect. 
6 In daily life there is a mass variety on causal scenario’s with differing complexity, e.g.,
finding the cause(s) of a mental illnesses,  understanding the determinants of partner
choice, pinpointing the cause of a car accident or a certain disease etc. The basic unit of a
causal scenario is an ‘if cause, then effect’ link. In this article we confine the research to
forward unicausal conditionals where one cause is linked to one effect.  Many studies
revealed that there is a robust relation between the perceived necessity and sufficiency of
the cause and the conclusions that reasoners draw from simple ‘if  cause, then effect’
conditionals. This perceived sufficiency and necessity (as perceived by the reasoner) is
conventionally equalled to the theoretical sufficiency and necessity as determined by the
researcher. It is however not yet clear whether the formal definitions of necessity and
sufficiency reflect the way reasoners use and interpret these concepts. Brennan (2003)
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already concluded that ‘there is a need for caution when we move from natural language
conditionals to analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions’ (p. 9). Despite this
underdeterminacy it is often argued that how people interpret the necessity expressed by
a conditional relation has a causal impact on the number and types of inferences that are
drawn (Thompson & Mann, 1995). By describing how people define and use the concepts
of  necessity  and  sufficiency  it  can  be  clarified  whether  the  levels  of  necessity  and
sufficiency as perceived by the experimenter converge with the ordinary, lay-people’s
perception of necessity and sufficiency. 
7 In logic, one proposition is a necessary condition of another when the second cannot be
true while the first is false, and one proposition is a sufficient condition for another when
the  first  cannot  be  true while  the  second  is  false.  Alternatively  formulated:  A  is  a
necessary condition for B if and only if it is never the case that B occurs and A does not
occur, A is a sufficient condition for B if and only if it is never the case that A occurs and B
does not occur (Facione, 1972). 
8 Research on conditional reasoning revealed that logical conceptions and definitions are
not  necessarily  psychologically  relevant  or  valid.  In  most  situations  people  take
information about the context as well as their background knowledge into account (for an
overview, see Politzer & Bourmaud, 2002). This renders logical assertions inapplicable.
According to logic one should base inferences solely on the content of the premises that
are  categorically  assumed  true.  Nonetheless,  the  definitions  used  by  reasoning
researchers  are  generally  comparable  to  the  formal  definitions1 Table  1  provides  an
overview of how reasoning researchers define the concepts of sufficiency and necessity.
Because the perceived levels of necessity and sufficiency are often used as predictors of
reasoning performance, it is important to investigate how these concepts are understood.
We will conduct three experiments that enable us to gain perspective on how people
understand the sufficiency and necessity in forward unicausal relations. 
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Table 1: Indications/definitions for necessity and sufficiency used by different reasoning
researchers
Experiment 1
9 What do people consider as necessary and sufficient conditions to conclude that the cause
is necessary or sufficient for the effect? A first step is to see how people define the two
concepts. In Experiment 1 participants are asked to give their own definition of (non)-
necessity and (non)-sufficiency in a written free response format.  To check the face-
validity  of  two  formal  definitions  of  necessity  and  sufficiency  the  answers  were
interpreted in terms of the listed co-occurrences of cause and effect. 
10 The two formal indications for sufficiency and necessity are 
11 For sufficiency: 
12  1. If the cause occurs, the effect always follows/must follow.
13 2. If the effect did not occur, the cause did not precede.
14 For necessity: 
15 1. If the effect occurs, the cause must have preceded. 
16 2. If the cause is absent, the effect cannot take place
17 There are two principles that can cause one indication to be preferred over the other. 
18 The first is the principle of causal priority (see e.g., Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2001). This
principle entails that causes ontologically precede their effects and not the other way
around. Given this regularity,  it  would be easier to think, reason and evaluate causal
relations in a forward than in a backward direction. The first indication of sufficiency and
the second indication of necessity are forward formulations, the other two are backward
formulations.
19 The second factor is the polarity of the formulation. It has already extensively been shown
that a premise containing a negation is harder to reason with than an affirmative premise
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(Schroyens,  Schaeken,  &  d’Ydewalle,  2001;  Schroyens,  Verschueren,  Schaeken,  &
d’Ydewalle,  2000).  The  first  indications  of  sufficiency  and  of  necessity  contain  only
affirmative propositions, while the second indications contain negated propositions. 
20 For sufficiency, the two facilitating factors co-occur in the first formulation, for necessity
one formulation favours directionality,  the other favours polarity.  Based on the free-
response data the occurrence of both types of formulations will be verified as well as the
complexity of the given definitions and paraphrases. 
MethodParticipants
21 The experiment was run with twenty-seven first year psychology students. The students
of this and the following experiments were all native speakers who participated in partial
fulfilment of course requirements. None of them received training in formal logic. 
Design and Procedure
22 Each participant received a paper with the following instructions and questions: 
23 Recent research on reasoning with causality revealed the importance of the concepts
necessity and sufficiency in human reasoning. Because these two concepts are rather
abstract  and difficult  to define,  you are asked to write down your own definition of
necessity  and  sufficiency.  Try  to  be  complete  and  precise  in  your  formulation
(paraphrase, circumscribe, what are the preconditions…). 
24 The cause is necessary for the effect, what does this mean to you?
25 The cause is not necessary for the effect, what does this mean to you? 
26 The cause is sufficient for the effect, what does this mean to you? 
27 The cause is not sufficient for the effect, what does this mean to you? 
28 Below each question the participants could write a few sentences. Participants were given
ten minutes to complete the task. Every participant was able to complete the task within
this given time frame. 
Results and Discussion
29 The answers were transcribed to highlight the different cause-effect combinations that
participants  mentioned  for  defining  necessity  and  sufficiency.  We  verified  in  which
direction cause and effect were linked and whether the propositions were negated or
affirmative. Table 2 provides an overview of the different cause-effect combinations that
were found in the answers. 
Necessity and sufficiencyDirection versus Polarity
30 The  four  sufficiency/necessity  indications  corresponding  to  the  formal  definitions
occurred in 50 of the 54 answers (93%). To verify whether there was any preference in the
two  formulations,  the  range  of  answers  was  narrowed  down  to  the  cases  where
participants listed only one combination of cause and effect. 
31 First, the polarity factor was checked: the number of times the affirmative formulations
were used was compared to the number of times the negative formulations were used.
For sufficiency, 24 of the 27 definitions (89%) consisted of the singular expression: ‘if the
cause is present, the effect will follow’. One participant wrongly reversed this formulation
‘if effect, then cause’ which points to necessity instead of sufficiency. The complementary
formulation ‘if there is no effect, the cause did not occur’ was not observed. This can be
linked  to  the  fact  that  people  do  not  always  accept  the  logical  (not  necessarily
psychological)  equivalence  between  the  conditional  (if  cause  then  effect)  and  its
contrapositive (if no effect then no cause; see e.g., Pollard & Evans, 1980). For necessity,
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15 out of 27 participants (56%) used the formulation ‘if the cause is absent, the effect
cannot follow’ whereas 4 out of 27 participants (15%) listed that ‘if the effect occurs, the
cause preceded’.  The polarity preference is  thus observed for sufficiency but  not  for
necessity.
32 Second, the effect of directionality was checked. Both dimensions were preferably defined
by the forward description (93% for sufficiency, 74% for necessity) rather than by the
backward description (4 % for sufficiency, 15% for necessity). The preference for forward
formulations  appears  to  be  stronger  for  sufficiency  than  for  necessity.  Presumably
because for sufficiency both facilitating factors (direction and polarity) are combined,
while for necessity the affirmative formulation goes from effect to cause. The observation
that participants used the forward but negative necessity formulation 15 times (56%) and
only used the backward yet affirmative formulation 4 times (15%) might suggest that the
direction of the model is more important than the polarity of the propositions contained
in the model. 
Necessary and sufficient
33 A special case of causal relation is when the cause is both sufficient and necessary for the
effect,  cause  and  effect  are  then  exclusively  related  to  each  other.  We  found  some
definitions of necessity and sufficiency that expressed his kind of equivalence relation.
The equivalence combination was ‘cause, thus effect’ (indication of sufficiency) with ‘no
cause,  thus no effect’  (indication of necessity).  For necessity there were 5 definitions
(18,5%) where the cause was considered necessary as well as sufficient, for sufficiency
there were none. This suggests that at least for some people the necessity of the cause is a
stronger warrant to full equivalence than the mere sufficiency of the cause. This is in
accordance with O’Brien and Davidson (1989), they observed that people treat a mere
necessary relation more frequently as a necessary and sufficient relation than a mere
sufficient relation. This asymmetric tendency towards equivalence can be linked to the
finding that relations that are necessary are considered as more causal than relations that
are mere sufficient (Siegler, 1976). 
Complexity
34 O’Brien and Davidson (1989) stated that the sufficiency of a relation could be established
by fewer instances than the necessity of a relation. To get an indication of the subjective
complexity of sufficiency and necessity, we looked at the number of situations (models)
that  are  present  in  each  description.  For  sufficiency,  there  were  25  single  model
formulations  {96.2%) and  1  dual  model,  for  necessity  there  were  19  single  models
formulations  (70.4%)  and 8  dual  model  formulations.  For  non-sufficiency  there  were
58.2% of single model formulations while there were only 36% for non-necessity. Taken
together these results reveal that the necessity dimension is subjectively more complex
than the sufficiency dimension. 
35 The answers of the participants contained information beyond what is presented in Table
2: For sufficiency 5 (out of 27) participants had a graded, more liberal interpretation, e.g.,
‘there is some sort of threshold for attaining the effect’ or ‘the cause has to be present to
some extent in order to bring along the effect’ and one definition of sufficiency could not
be  linked  to  a  cause-effect  combination:  ‘the  cause  can  be  enough  to  warrant  a
conclusion’2.
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Table 2: Number of participants that included the following models in their definitions of necessity,
sufficiency, non-necessity and non-sufficiency
Non-sufficiency and non-necessity
36 The definitions of non-sufficiency and non-necessity of Table 2 were compared to the
definitions  of  sufficiency and necessity.  Most  definitions  of  non-sufficiency and non-
necessity  are  modified  versions  of  the  definitions  of  sufficiency  and necessity.  The
dominant indication for sufficiency ‘cause, thus effect’ was given by 24 subjects (89%).
The denial of this proposition is ‘cause, thus no effect’, this indication for non-sufficiency
was  given  by  22  subjects   (81.5%).  Four  other  participants  (14.8)  used  this  denied
indication in combination with a ‘no effect, thus no cause’ indication. The definitions of
non-sufficiency are thus strongly related to the definitions of sufficiency. 
37 The  dominant  indication  for  necessity  was  ‘no  cause,  thus  no  effect’  (55.6%).  This
formulation contains two negated propositions. In order to deny a negated proposition,
people have to solve a double negation, which imposes a severe cognitive load (see e.g.
Schroyens et al., 2001). Not surprisingly, for defining non-necessity the denied form of
the dominant indication ‘no cause, thus effect’ was only mentioned by one subject (3,7%).
The second dominant indication of necessity (18,5%) consisted of two models: ‘no cause,
thus no effect’ and ‘cause, thus effect’. For non-necessity, ten participants (37%) repeated
this  first  model  and  denied  the  second model  into  ‘no  cause,  thus  effect’.  For  non-
necessity  the  denied,  single  model  version  ‘effect,  thus  no  cause’  was  given  by  6
participants (22,2%). 
38 Some  responses  revealed  that  the  link  cause-effect  in  non-necessary  relations  is
indeterminate: Two participants (7,4%) stated that the effect may or may not follow the
cause and four participants (14,8) stated that the cause may or may not precede the
effect. 
39 For describing non-sufficiency 23 (85,2) participants used a single model, while four (14,8)
used two models. For describing non-necessity, nine (33.3%) participants used a single
model, while sixteen used two models. This converges with our previous  findings on the
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contrast  sufficiency-necessity:  The  necessity-dimension  is  more  complex  than  the
sufficiency dimension. 
Summary
40 There  were  a  considerable  number  of  answers  that  are  congruent  with  the  formal
definition. The results revealed that participants are more inclined to define sufficiency
and necessity by using a forward formulation rather than by a backward formulation, this
can  be  linked  to  the  causal  priority  principle.  The  data  also  showed  that  the
representation of the dimension of necessity is more complex than the representation of
sufficiency. The indications of non-sufficiency and non-necessity are often the denied
version of sufficiency and necessity, respectively. Whereas necessity is stronger linked to
equivalence than sufficiency, non-necessity is stronger linked to indeterminacy than non-
sufficiency. 
41 Now that we have some grasp on how participants define the concepts of necessity and
sufficiency, we will ask them in Experiment 2 to rate the necessity and sufficiency of the
cause for different causal situations. This will inform us on how the two concepts are
actually used. 
Experiment 2
42 Whereas the previous experiment focussed on the definition of the concepts of necessity
and sufficiency, we will now test how participants assess the sufficiency or necessity of
different situations. In order to explore people’s assessment behaviour we constructed
nine possible unicausal relations by systematically varying the likelihood of the effect
(follows always/maybe/never) for situations where the cause is either present or absent.
Table 3 displays the nine resulting relations, the schematic representation of the relation
is  based  on  Edgington  (1995,  p.  262).  For  each  of  the  relations,  the  following  four
questions were asked: 
43 Is the cause sufficient for the effect? yes/no
44 Is the cause necessary for the effect? yes/no
45 Can the cause occur without the effect following? yes/no
46 Can the effect occur without the cause preceding? yes/no
47 Question 1 and 2 are called literal formulations; the participants are asked whether the
cause is sufficient or necessary without further explanation/explication. Questions 3 and
4 are called guided questions, these questions compel subjects to verify two conditions
that  are  diagnostic  for  the  necessity  and  sufficiency  of  the  cause  (both  affirmative
formulations). For the two literal questions, we scored the ‘yes’ answers as 1, for the two
guided questions  the ‘no’  answers  were scored as  1.  The two guided questions  were
included to see whether participants can extract the minimal information needed to
answer the literal questions 1 and 2. The comprehension of a certain causal relation is not
necessarily an all-or-none affair.  Participants may be able to verify a certain relation
when put in concrete wordings,  without having the ability to comprehend the more
complex or formal description (Bindra, Clarke, Schultz,1980). 
Method
48 Eighty-nine first  year psychology students participated in the experiment.  The cover
story read that scientists were sent to newly discovered planets in order to investigate
some extraordinary physical phenomena. Participants were informed about the causal
relation the scientists expected to observe (causal conditional) and about the scientists’
actual observations concerning this causal relation (factual causal relation). Next, they
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were asked to evaluate this factual causal relation. The cause and effect propositions were
replaced by content-lean propositions to form a novel (arbitrary) causal relation, the 9
novel causal relations can be found in the Appendix. This was done to minimise the effect
of background knowledge; participants could only rely on the presented relations to infer
the necessity and sufficiency. The task looked as follows (translated from Dutch): 
49 On the planet Bur you can find a sticky green substance. Scientists assume that: 
50 If the sticky green substance is heated, then it turns lightly pink.
51 Extensive observation revealed the factual relation between ‘heating the green substance’
and ‘  turning pink’.  This factual relation can be summarised as follows. Note that all
situations that are relevant for the relation between cause and effect are examined.
52 Is heating the green substance sufficient for it turning pink? yes/no
53 Is heating the green substance necessary for it turning pink? yes/no
54 Can the substance be heated without this substance turning pink? yes/no
55 Can the substance turn pink without the substance being heated? yes/no
56 The instructions made clear that the left column referred to the two mutually exclusive
possible antecedent conditions and the corresponding row of the right column informed
them  on  the  respective  consequent  possibilities.  All  participants  received  the  nine
possible situations (see Table 3). Each situation was presented on a separate sheet and the
order  of  the  nine  situations  was  counterbalanced.   For  each depicted causal  relation
participants were asked to answer the four questions about necessity and sufficiency. In
addition, they were asked to solve one of four conditional inferences (MP, MT, AC, and
DA)  for  each  presented  relation.  The  results  of  the  reasoning  task  are  discussed  in
Verschueren,  Schroyens,  Schaeken,  and  d’Ydewalle  (2004).  The  table  depicting  the
relation remained visible for the participants when they answered the four questions and
the reasoning problem.
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Table 3: Schematic representation of the 9 situations used in Experiment 3 (reference number
between square brackets).
Results and discussionInterpretation of sufficiency and necessity
57 Figure 1 displays the mean ratings for sufficiency and necessity, for the literal and guided
formulation as well as the criterion score that is expected when the formal definition(s)
are applied. The criterion necessity score for situation 5 is undetermined: If the effect
never occurs it is impossible to derive the necessity of the cause for this effect.
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Figure 1. Experiment 2: Mean score of sufficiency and necessity on the guided and the literal
questions, compared with the criterion score for each of the nine situations.
Literal versus guided formulation
58 First, the literal and the guided formulation will be compared in order to discover certain
misconceptions. A Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA by ranks indicated that for all four ratings there
was a significant effect of the situation type, for necessity /literal: H(8, N=782) = 602.6, p <
.001;  for sufficiency/literal:  H(8,  N =  782) =  367,  p <  .001;  for necessity/guided:  H(8,  782)
 =573.75,  p <  .001;  for  sufficiency/guided:  H(8,  782) =  543.17,  p <  .001.  Next,  we discuss
specific contrasts for the four situations where the literal and the guided formulation
differed. 
59 Most surprising was that the situations 7, 8, and 9 received a significantly higher rating
for sufficiency in the literal formulation than in the guided formulation. For situation 7:
Wilcoxon T = 119, N non-ties = 33, p < .005 (Mliteral = .697, Mguided = .090), for situation 8: T = 41,
N = 40, p < .001 (Mliteral = .573, Mguided = .022) and for situation 9: T = 66, N = 32, p < .001 (M
literal = .674, Mguided = .056). In all three situations the cause could both be followed by the
effect and not followed by the effect.  The observation that a majority of participants
considered  the  cause  sufficient  even when the  effect  did  not  always  follow possibly
indicates  that  participants  do  not  follow  the  logical  definition  of  sufficiency.  The
subjective conception of  sufficiency is  more liberal  than the formal  conception.  This
converges with our previous observations: The results of Experiment 1 showed that 18%
of the participants used a formulation indicating a graded property for the sufficiency
definition. 
60 For necessity, the situation that yielded a significant difference between the literal and
the guided rating was situation 4. The cause depicted in situation 4 received a higher
rating for necessity in the guided formulation than in the literal formulation, T = 86, N =
85, p < .001 (Mliteral = .023, Mguided = .648). This relation consisted of two models: ‘cause - no
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effect’ and ‘no cause – effect’, the reverse relation of an equivalence relation. This is an
odd relation; the cause prevents instead of causes the effect. On the guided question ‘can
the effect occur without the cause’ participants should answer ‘yes’ (low necessity). The
surprisingly high necessity scores may reflect confusion or misreading. 
Subjective versus objective sufficiency and necessity
61 When we compared the scores given by participants  with the criterion score that  is
expected based on the formal definition, we see that for sufficiency situation 3 received a
lower score than expected, whereas situation 5 received a higher score. The relation of
situation 5 shows that the effect never occurs, regardless of the presence of the cause. It
is  quite  surprising  that  for  this  situation  almost  all  participants  label  the  cause  as
sufficient. A possible reason might be that participants have misread the given situation
as  ‘cause-effect  and  no  cause-no  effect’,  which  corresponds  to  a  prototypical  causal
relation. The lower score for sufficiency on situation 3 converges with previous findings.
Verschueren et al. (2004) report an experiment with a different setup, they found that the
subjective sufficiency ratings of  a  sufficient but not necessary cause are significantly
lower than the sufficiency ratings for a relation where the cause is both sufficient and
necessary. They explained this result by referring to the complexity of the relation; a
sufficient but not necessary relation is more complex to represent than a sufficient and
necessary relation. A similar line of reasoning can be followed here: There is no a priori
reason to expect a drop in sufficiency, both situation 1 and situation 2 received a high
sufficiency rating, showing that the ‘no cause – effect’ as well as the ‘no cause – no effect’
model are possible when the cause is sufficient. The only difference is that for situation
three, there are three models to be integrated instead of two and there is no simple way
of summarising the relation. This increased complexity can by itself lead to an increased
uncertainty or a misunderstanding. 
62 The obtained ratings for situation 5 and to some extent also situation 4 and 6 suggest that
participants have trouble grasping the meaning of these causal relations.  There are many
different ways in which a conditional can be interpreted. Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002)
list twelve possible interpretations that people may attain by semantic and pragmatic
modulation  of  a  given  conditional  formulation.  The  situations  4,  5  and  6  do  not
correspond to any of the twelve conditional interpretations listed by Johnson-Laird. It is
thus possible that participants fail to answer some of the questions about necessity and
sufficiency because they have trouble representing the given relation. If this confusion
has  arisen  because  of  the  phrasing  as  a  causal  conditional,  presenting  the  same
information without a conditional embedding may bypass the problem.
Conditions to conclude that a cause is sufficient/necessary. 
63 In this paragraph we will investigate whether participants rely on one of the two formal
indications,  or  both,  to  assess  the  sufficiency  and  necessity  of  a  given  cause.  For
sufficiency, the two indications were (a: affirmative) when the cause occurs the effect
follows and (b:  negative)  the absence of  the effect implies  the absence of  the cause.
Situation 1 in Table 3 contains only the affirmative formulation while situations 2 and 3
also contain the negative formulation. There are no significant differences in the rating of
sufficiency between both situations ( F020chi2 = 1.33 for situation 1 vs. 3; chi2 = 0 for situation 2
vs. 3). It seems that the affirmative sufficiency- model is enough to grant the conclusion
that the cause is sufficient for the effect. The addition of a negative sufficiency model
does not increase the perceived sufficiency. Whether the negative sufficiency-model is
sufficient by itself cannot be tested with the present design.
The interpretation of the concepts ‘necessity’ and ‘sufficiency’ in forward u...
Current psychology letters, 14, Vol. 3, 2004 | 2004
11
64 A cause is necessary for the effect when (a:  affirmative) the occurrence of the effect
implies the occurrence of the cause and (b: negative) the absence of the cause implies the
absence of the effect. The relation depicted by situation 5 contains only the situation
model corresponding to the forward (negative) formulation of necessity, while situation 2
and 8 contain both the forward and the backward formulation of necessity. Experiment 1
showed that participants preferred the forward formulation to define necessity. The Mac
Nemar Change test revealed that the negative situational model ‘no cause thus no effect’
is by itself insufficient to consider the cause a necessary condition for the effect (chi2 =
80.01, p < .001 for diagram 5 vs. 2; chi2 = 70.01, p < .001 for diagram 5 vs. 8). Participants
only inferred that the cause was necessary when the diagram revealed that the cause
always preceded the effect. This shows that participants are not inclined to verify the
negative  version  of  necessity  or  that  they  consider  this  negative  relation  by  itself
insufficient to conclude that the cause is necessary for the effect. The present data do not
inform  us  about  whether  the  affirmative  necessity-model  is  sufficient  to  trigger  a
necessity conclusion. 
Summary
65 We conclude that participants have a fairly accurate understanding of necessity (with
exception of  situation 4),  but  that  they do not  understand what  sufficiency logically
entails. The comparison between the literal and the guided formulation make clear that
their  spontaneous,  subjective  understanding  of  sufficiency leads  to  a  different
information extraction than the one suggested by the formal, guided question.
66 It is found that the affirmative and forward model is sufficient to conclude that a cause is
sufficient. This converges nicely with the preference of defining sufficiency by use of the
forward formulation found in Experiment 1. For necessity, both definitions have their
value, although the preferred negative and forward model is insufficient to conclude that
a cause is necessary. 
Experiment 3
67 In Experiment 2 it was found that for situations where the cause may or may not be
followed by the effect (situations 7, 8, and 9) the majority of the participants consider the
cause as  sufficient  for  the effect.  This  is  a  surprising observation that  will  be tested
further in Experiment 3. We will use a truth-table format to verify whether participants
consider the combination ‘cause and no effect’ a valid possibility when they are told that
the cause is sufficient to produce the effect. Truth-table research is classically used to
investigate how a certain relation is  interpreted and represented (see e.g.  Newstead,
Evans, & Byrne, 1993). In this task participants are confronted with an ‘if cause, then
effect’- statement and are asked to evaluate the four possible combinations of presence/
absence of cause and effect. 
68 In Experiment 1 we found that some participants do not define sufficiency as an all-or-
non-property  but  rather  as  a  graded property.  In  Experiment  2  the  majority  of  the
participants considered the cause of a relation where the effect may or may not follow as
sufficient  for  the effect.  If  indeed sufficiency does not  have a determinate,  stringent
structure we expect that some participants allow the combination ‘cause and no effect’
and still consider the cause as sufficient. 
Method
69 Twenty-eight students took part in the study. They were all tested at the same time. For
each of the four combinations of cause and effect, participants were asked to indicate
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whether the combination was possible for a sufficient/necessary cause. Figure 2 gives an
example of the task, including the responses we should observe when participants rely on
the  formal  definitions.  The  definition  of  sufficiency  does  not  relate  to  the  third
combination, the definition of necessity does not relate to the fourth combination, both
are possible but not necessarily present. When participants have indeed a more liberal
interpretation  of  sufficiency,  we  expect  that  the  ‘cause –  no  effect’  combination  is
considered as possible in a significant proportion of trials. When a reasoner considers a
certain combination possible, the answer is scored as 1; when it is considered impossible
it is scored as 0.
 
Figure 2. Truth-table task for investigating the necessity and sufficiency interpretation
Results and discussion
 
Table 4: Percentage of trials in which the combinations are considered possible, standard
deviations are given between brackets (N =28).
70 Table  4  displays  the  percentage  of  possible-answers.  First,  for  sufficiency  the  two
combinations corresponding to the formal definitions were more often considered as
possible than the two other combinations. The ‘cause – effect’ combination received a
100% score, the ‘no cause – no effect’ combination for sufficiency was considered possible
in  85.7%.  There  was  a  marginally  significant  difference  between  these  two  formal
indicators  (T =  0,  Z =  1.826,  n =  4,  p =  .068).  This  finding  underscores  the  findings  of
Experiment 1: people consider the ‘no cause – no effect’ combination by itself not as a
valid indication for sufficiency. The formally illegal combination ‘cause - no effect’ scored
significantly lower (60.7%) than the two formal combinations (C noE vs CE: Wilcoxon T = 0,
Z = 2.934, n non-ties = 11, p < .05; C noE vs. noC noE: T = 5, Z = 2.073, n = 9, p <.05). Despite
that the ‘no cause – effect’ combination should be considered possible, we observe that
this combination (that may or may not occur) receives a significantly lower score than
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the two formal combinations that have to occur (noC E vs. CE: T = 0, Z = 3.408, n = 15, p
 = <.01; noC vs. noC no E: T = 0, Z = 2.343, n = 27, p = <.05). Surprisingly, the formally illegal
‘cause, no effect’ combination did not differ significantly from the formally possible but
not necessary ‘no cause - effect’ combination. (46.4%; T = 26, Z = 1.020, n = 12, p = .3078).
The  formally  illegal  ‘cause –  no  effect’  combination  was  considered  possible  in  61%
whereas the ‘no cause – effect’ combination was considered possible only in 46% percent
of the cases. This observation converges with the findings of Experiment 1 and 2. We
conclude  that  (some)  participants  understand  sufficiency  in  an  indeterminate  way,
allowing that the effect may not follow the cause.  
71 Second, we consider the results for necessity. According to the formal conceptualisation
of  necessity  the  ‘no  cause –  effect’  combination  is  illegal,  whereas  the  combination
‘cause – no effect’ is possible but not necessary. The two formally legal  combinations
‘cause  -  effect’  and  ‘no cause  -  no  effect’  received  high  scores  and  did  no  differ
significantly (96.4% and 92.9% respectively; p  =  .592).  The formally illegal  ‘no cause -
effect’ combination received a significantly lower score (14.3%; noC E vs. CE: T = 13, Z =
4.023, n = 25, p <.01; noC E vs. noC no E: T = 0, Z = 4.106, n = 22, p <.01). According to the
formal definition, the combination ‘cause - no effect’ may or may not occur and should
thus be considered as possible,  57.1% of the participants considered this combination
possible. This is a significantly lower score than the two combinations that are always
true (C noE vs. CE: T = 0, Z = 2.934, n = 11, p <.01; C noE vs. noC noE: T = 15, Z = 2.354, n = 14,
p <.05) but it received a significantly higher score than the formally illegal ‘no cause,
effect’ combination (T = 28.5, Z = 2.484, n = 18,  p <.05). 
72 When we look at the patterns of relevant combinations for a sufficient cause, there were 8
participants who considered the ‘cause – effect’, ‘cause – no effect’ and the ‘no cause – no
effect’ combinations respectively possible, impossible and possible (29%), whereas there
were 16 participants who found all three combinations possible (57%). The alternative,
more  liberal  interpretation  of  sufficiency  occurs  thus  more  often  than  the  formal
interpretation.  For  necessity,  there  were  22  participants  that  considered  the  ‘cause-
effect’, ‘no cause-effect’ and ‘no cause- no effect’ respectively possible, impossible and
possible (79%), whereas only 3 participants considered all three combinations possible
(11%).  The  ‘no  cause –effect’  combination  is  thus  understood  as  a  combination  that
contradicts necessity.
Summary
73 The  results  from Experiment  3  confirm the  findings  from Experiment  1  and  2.  The
majority of  participants interpret  sufficiency as a graded property whereas necessity
keeps its all-or-none status. About six out of ten participants considered ‘cause and no
effect’ a possible combination for a sufficient cause. When a cause is necessary for an
effect, the ‘no cause – effect’ combination is not accepted. 
General discussion
74 The  current  research  highlights  the  importance  of  distinguishing  the  subjective
definition  of  necessity  and  sufficiency  from  their  formal  definitions.  Although  the
subjective conceptualisation of necessity parallels the formal definition; the subjective
concept of sufficiency is different, less stringent than the formal concept. The current
finding about the subjective meaning of sufficiency can be related to some recent findings
about abstract conditional reasoning,  that show that contrary to formal logic,  people
often think about conditionals in an indeterminate way (Evans & Over, 2003; Oberauer &
Wilhelm, 2003). 
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75 Putting it  strong,  people  do not  use  the  concept  of  sufficiency in  its  logical,  formal
meaning. This observation can be linked to the current debate on everyday Rationality-1
and normative Rationality-2 (Evans & Over, 1996). The Rationality 2-criterion dictated by
normative theories is not suited to evaluate an everyday, Rationality-1 way of thinking.
Vanquickenborne (1969) already argued that because in everyday situations it is rather
exceptional that the cause is always followed by the effect (sufficiency) or that the effect
is  always  preceded  by  the  cause  (necessity), the  causal  relations  used  in  everyday
language are weaker than a strictly sufficient and/or necessary condition. To give an
example;  smoking causes lung cancer.  What would be expected when asked whether
smoking is a sufficient cause for lung cancer? Because most people know smokers who
did not get lung cancer, smoking can formally not be considered as a sufficient condition.
However, it is commonly known that smoking significantly increases the probability of
getting lung cancer. This graded, positive relationship between cause and effect can be
sufficient to label the cause as sufficient for the effect. Indeed, in a previous study we
asked one group of participants whether the cause is sufficient/necessary for the effect.
Another group was asked whether it is possible that the effect does not follow the cause
(sufficient) and that the cause does not precede the effect (necessary). Surprisingly, there
was a considerable number of sentences where the majority of participants said that it
was  possible  that  the  cause  was  not  followed  by  the  effect  while  at  the  same  time
participants  still  considered  the  cause  sufficient  for  the  effect.  For  instance,  for  the
sentence:’If you drink coffee late in the evening, then it is harder to fall asleep’ there were 95%
of the participants said that it was possible to drink coffee late in the evening and not
making it harder to fall asleep, yet 86% of the participants said that the cause (drinking
late night coffee) was sufficient to fall asleep.
76 What makes then that sufficiency is interpreted as less determinate than necessity? When
we analyse the relevance and occurrence of both dimensions for everyday situations, we
can suggest a possible reason. It has already been shown that the search for necessary
causes is triggered in case of an undesired effect, while the search for a sufficient cause is
triggered in case of a desired effect (Lewicka, 1989; 1992). In case the effect is not desired,
it is important to find a way of categorically preventing this effect. If people know of a
necessary precondition for the effect, the total absence of this precondition serves the
purpose. However, for a desired effect it can be interesting to be merely able to augment
the probability of this effect taking place. This can already reveal that it can be more
adaptive to consider sufficiency in gradual terms and necessity in categorical terms. 
77 An  important  consequence  of  the  observed  divergence  between  the  formal  and  the
subjective  definitions  is  that  the  effect  of  necessity  and  sufficiency  on  conditional
reasoning has to be reconsidered. It is often stated that the subjective levels of necessity
and  sufficiency  predict  the  reasoning  performance,  but  it  remains  yet  to  be  tested
whether it is the perceived levels of necessity and sufficiency that are reflected in the
reasoning  results  rather  than  the  objective  levels  that  are  manipulated  by  the
researchers. The recent findings of Verschueren, Schroyens, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle
(2004) can provide a partial answer. They found that effects on inference acceptance rates
are not always mediated by effects in the subjective necessity and sufficiency ratings.
They suggest that participants do not base their inferences on their assessment of the
cause as necessary and sufficient. The question then remains why the objective levels of
necessity and sufficiency have such a pervasive impact on the reasoning results, even
when abstract premises are used. 
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78 A second, related observation is that the concept of necessity is more complex than the
concept  of  sufficiency.  According to  O’Brien and Davidson (1996)  this  is  because  the
sufficiency of a cause can be established by fewer instances (mental models) than the
necessity of a cause. Although we only considered unicausal relations, we found evidence
corroborating  this  claim:  To  verify  sufficiency  participants  verify  only  one  (gradual)
relation, whereas for necessity the criterion is more stringent (all-or-none) and consists
of two indications. Each of this two indicators by itself requires more cognitive resources
than the affirmative forward ‘cause thus effect’ indicator of sufficiency: ‘effect thus cause’
is backward, ‘no cause thus no effect’ contains a negation. We do not know whether both
indicators of necessity are used to assess the status of a cause, but it was found that the
recognition of the first model is insufficient to conclude that a cause is necessary. Taken
together this corroborates the finding that necessity is more complex than sufficiency.
79 In sum, the subjective conceptualisations of necessity and sufficiency do not parallel the
formal definitions that are used in the literature on causal reasoning. It seems to be more
ecologically valid to define sufficiency in terms of for instance the likelihood that the
cause brings about the effect,  rather than in terms of an all-or-none property.  When
investigating the effect of the necessity and sufficiency of the cause on causal reasoning
or decision making, researchers should stop at the thought of a valid operationalisation
of these constructs. A look at how reasoners understand the central theoretical concepts
can avoid theoretical aberrations. 
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Appendix: Different contexts used for Experiment 2
81 The  names  of the  different  planets  were  chosen  to  avoid  spontaneous  semantic
associations (for Dutch-speaking subjects).  There were nine different planets: Bur, Lif,
Zom, Wex, Muk, Nac, Loz, Keq, and Vyb. 
82 The nine novel causal relations were: 
83 1. If you heat the green sticky substance, then it turns light pink 
84 2. If the small white animals are exposed to sunlight, then they die 
85 3. If you drop these pearly pebbles, then they break in two 
86 4. If you drink the blue fluid, then your head starts spinning 
87 5. If you pull a bright yellow leaf from this plant, then there appears a black bud
88 6. If you boil these sweet tasting fruits, then they become bitter tasting 
89 7. If the purple gas adds to the red gas, then there is an explosion
90 8. If two of these orange marbles touch, then a poisonous smoke evaporates from them
91 9. If the treacly black stuff is stirred, then the stuff becomes glassy 
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NOTES
1. The interdefinable definitions, such as A is a sufficient condition for B, if and only if the
absence of A is a necessary condition of the absence of B, are not taken into account. We also
take distance from the discussion whether participants understand the concept of logical
necessity (as in necessity implies possibility but not vice versa).
2. For non-sufficiency, 5 participants said that although the cause cannot bring along the
effect by itself, the cause is a necessary precondition for the effect. For non-necessity, 8
participants explicitly stated that there were alternative causes that could bring about
the effect and one participant wrongly explained non-sufficiency by saying that the only
way to obtain the effect is to prevent the cause from occurring. For non-necessity there
were two answers that could not be linked to the cause-effect combinations: For non-
necessity both answers came down to the same: ‘the effect occurs by itself, with or
without a cause’.
The interpretation of the concepts ‘necessity’ and ‘sufficiency’ in forward u...
Current psychology letters, 14, Vol. 3, 2004 | 2004
18
ABSTRACTS
Necessity and sufficiency are two central concepts in the literature on causal reasoning. Three
experiments are reported that investigate how people understand these two concepts. It is found
that necessity is more a complex notion than the notion of sufficiency. For sufficiency, people
only verify whether the cause is always followed by the effect, whereas for necessity, there are
two possibilities that can be verified: ‘does the cause always precede the effect’  and ‘can the
effect occur without the cause’. More importantly, it is found that both concepts have a different
structure: necessity is considered as an all-or-none property whereas sufficiency is a more liberal
characteristic. The present findings highlight the need for an appropriate operationalisation for
measuring the perceived necessity and sufficiency of given cause-effect relations. 
La  nécessité  et  la  suffisance  sont  deux  concepts  centraux  de  la  littérature  consacrée  au
raisonnement causal. Trois expériences analysant la manière qu’ont les individus de comprendre
ces deux concepts sont exposées dans cet article. Les résultats indiquent que la nécessité est une
notion plus complexe que celle de suffisance. Pour la suffisance, les sujets vérifient seulement si
la  cause  est  suivie  de  l’effet,  alors  que  pour  la  nécessité,  deux  possibilités  peuvent  être
examinées:“la cause précède-t-elle toujours l’effet?”et “l’effet peut-il apparaître sans la cause ?”.
Plus important encore, ces deux concepts manifestent une structure différente: la nécessité est
considérée comme une propriété de type tout ou rien alors que la suffisance est vue comme une
propriété plus graduelle. Les résultats soulignent l’utilité d’une opérationnalisation appropriée
afin de mesurer la nécessité et la suffisance telles qu’elles sont perçues par les individus.
INDEX
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